Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet

Najib Ali Gisymar; Meysella Al Firdha Hanim; Danang Wahyu Muhammad; Ahdiana Yuni Lestari; Erna Tri Rusmala Ratnawati

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20

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Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet

Najib Ali Gisymar^*

, Meysella Al Firdha Hanim

, Danang Wahyu Muhammad

, Ahdiana Yuni Lestari

, Erna Tri Rusmala Ratnawati

Published in International Journal of Law and Society (Volume 8, Issue 4)

Received: 18 November 2025 Accepted: 1 December 2025 Published: 20 December 2025

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Abstract

This study analyzes the legal and institutional aspects of the establishment of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' during the early period of Prabowo Subianto's administration. The approach used is juridical-normative with doctrinal content analysis of primary regulations regarding the establishment and governance of Danantara supported by a systematic literature review combined with a comparative mapping of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) practices and the GAPP (Santiago Principles). Evaluation indicators include: legal basis and certainty of status, institutional design and lines of accountability, governance (composition and functions of boards/committees, checks and balances), transparency and auditing, clarity of investment mandates and role separation, risk management including ESG, and control of conflicts of interest. The results indicate three clusters of weaknesses: (i) legal absence of lex specialis and clear fiscal ring-fencing; (ii) institutional overlapping authorities of the government, Investment Management Agency, and Danantara, as well as weak independent oversight; and (iii) practice limitations in proactive reporting, the non-operational status of ESG policies, and inadequate conflict of interest regulations. The conclusion emphasizes the prematurity of Danantara as a reliable state investment entity. Recommendations include a legislative roadmap towards lex specialis, clarification of mandate demarcation, mandatory periodic public reporting, independent external audits, mainstreaming ESG based on indicators, and strengthening the conflict of interest prevention regime.

Published in	International Journal of Law and Society (Volume 8, Issue 4)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20
Page(s)	369-378
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Prematurity Investment, National Investment Fund Danantara, Management Institution, Accountability, Prabowo’s Cabinet

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Gisymar, N. A., Hanim, M. A. F., Muhammad, D. W., Lestari, A. Y., Ratnawati, E. T. R. (2025). Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet. International Journal of Law and Society, 8(4), 369-378. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20

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ACS Style

Gisymar, N. A.; Hanim, M. A. F.; Muhammad, D. W.; Lestari, A. Y.; Ratnawati, E. T. R. Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet. Int. J. Law Soc. 2025, 8(4), 369-378. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20

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AMA Style

Gisymar NA, Hanim MAF, Muhammad DW, Lestari AY, Ratnawati ETR. Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet. Int J Law Soc. 2025;8(4):369-378. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20

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@article{10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20,
  author = {Najib Ali Gisymar and Meysella Al Firdha Hanim and Danang Wahyu Muhammad and Ahdiana Yuni Lestari and Erna Tri Rusmala Ratnawati},
  title = {Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet},
  journal = {International Journal of Law and Society},
  volume = {8},
  number = {4},
  pages = {369-378},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijls.20250804.20},
  abstract = {This study analyzes the legal and institutional aspects of the establishment of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' during the early period of Prabowo Subianto's administration. The approach used is juridical-normative with doctrinal content analysis of primary regulations regarding the establishment and governance of Danantara supported by a systematic literature review combined with a comparative mapping of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) practices and the GAPP (Santiago Principles). Evaluation indicators include: legal basis and certainty of status, institutional design and lines of accountability, governance (composition and functions of boards/committees, checks and balances), transparency and auditing, clarity of investment mandates and role separation, risk management including ESG, and control of conflicts of interest. The results indicate three clusters of weaknesses: (i) legal absence of lex specialis and clear fiscal ring-fencing; (ii) institutional overlapping authorities of the government, Investment Management Agency, and Danantara, as well as weak independent oversight; and (iii) practice limitations in proactive reporting, the non-operational status of ESG policies, and inadequate conflict of interest regulations. The conclusion emphasizes the prematurity of Danantara as a reliable state investment entity. Recommendations include a legislative roadmap towards lex specialis, clarification of mandate demarcation, mandatory periodic public reporting, independent external audits, mainstreaming ESG based on indicators, and strengthening the conflict of interest prevention regime.},
 year = {2025}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet
AU  - Najib Ali Gisymar
AU  - Meysella Al Firdha Hanim
AU  - Danang Wahyu Muhammad
AU  - Ahdiana Yuni Lestari
AU  - Erna Tri Rusmala Ratnawati
Y1  - 2025/12/20
PY  - 2025
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20
T2  - International Journal of Law and Society
JF  - International Journal of Law and Society
JO  - International Journal of Law and Society
SP  - 369
EP  - 378
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-1908
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20
AB  - This study analyzes the legal and institutional aspects of the establishment of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' during the early period of Prabowo Subianto's administration. The approach used is juridical-normative with doctrinal content analysis of primary regulations regarding the establishment and governance of Danantara supported by a systematic literature review combined with a comparative mapping of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) practices and the GAPP (Santiago Principles). Evaluation indicators include: legal basis and certainty of status, institutional design and lines of accountability, governance (composition and functions of boards/committees, checks and balances), transparency and auditing, clarity of investment mandates and role separation, risk management including ESG, and control of conflicts of interest. The results indicate three clusters of weaknesses: (i) legal absence of lex specialis and clear fiscal ring-fencing; (ii) institutional overlapping authorities of the government, Investment Management Agency, and Danantara, as well as weak independent oversight; and (iii) practice limitations in proactive reporting, the non-operational status of ESG policies, and inadequate conflict of interest regulations. The conclusion emphasizes the prematurity of Danantara as a reliable state investment entity. Recommendations include a legislative roadmap towards lex specialis, clarification of mandate demarcation, mandatory periodic public reporting, independent external audits, mainstreaming ESG based on indicators, and strengthening the conflict of interest prevention regime.
VL  - 8
IS  - 4
ER  -

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Author Information

Najib Ali Gisymar

Faculty of Law, Widya Mataram University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Contact Email

http://orcid.org/0009-0005-6103-6159
Meysella Al Firdha Hanim

Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Universitas Gadjah, Mada, Indonesia

Contact Email

http://orcid.org/0009-0003-0703-6452
Danang Wahyu Muhammad

Faculty of Law, Universitas Muhammadiyah, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Contact Email

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0617-9534
Ahdiana Yuni Lestari

Faculty of Law, Universitas Muhammadiyah, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Contact Email

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3028-0619
Erna Tri Rusmala Ratnawati

Faculty of Law, Widya Mataram University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Contact Email

http://orcid.org/0009-0001-2175-486X

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APA Style

Gisymar, N. A., Hanim, M. A. F., Muhammad, D. W., Lestari, A. Y., Ratnawati, E. T. R. (2025). Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet. International Journal of Law and Society, 8(4), 369-378. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20

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ACS Style

Gisymar, N. A.; Hanim, M. A. F.; Muhammad, D. W.; Lestari, A. Y.; Ratnawati, E. T. R. Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet. Int. J. Law Soc. 2025, 8(4), 369-378. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20

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AMA Style

Gisymar NA, Hanim MAF, Muhammad DW, Lestari AY, Ratnawati ETR. Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet. Int J Law Soc. 2025;8(4):369-378. doi: 10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20,
  author = {Najib Ali Gisymar and Meysella Al Firdha Hanim and Danang Wahyu Muhammad and Ahdiana Yuni Lestari and Erna Tri Rusmala Ratnawati},
  title = {Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet},
  journal = {International Journal of Law and Society},
  volume = {8},
  number = {4},
  pages = {369-378},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijls.20250804.20},
  abstract = {This study analyzes the legal and institutional aspects of the establishment of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' during the early period of Prabowo Subianto's administration. The approach used is juridical-normative with doctrinal content analysis of primary regulations regarding the establishment and governance of Danantara supported by a systematic literature review combined with a comparative mapping of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) practices and the GAPP (Santiago Principles). Evaluation indicators include: legal basis and certainty of status, institutional design and lines of accountability, governance (composition and functions of boards/committees, checks and balances), transparency and auditing, clarity of investment mandates and role separation, risk management including ESG, and control of conflicts of interest. The results indicate three clusters of weaknesses: (i) legal absence of lex specialis and clear fiscal ring-fencing; (ii) institutional overlapping authorities of the government, Investment Management Agency, and Danantara, as well as weak independent oversight; and (iii) practice limitations in proactive reporting, the non-operational status of ESG policies, and inadequate conflict of interest regulations. The conclusion emphasizes the prematurity of Danantara as a reliable state investment entity. Recommendations include a legislative roadmap towards lex specialis, clarification of mandate demarcation, mandatory periodic public reporting, independent external audits, mainstreaming ESG based on indicators, and strengthening the conflict of interest prevention regime.},
 year = {2025}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet
AU  - Najib Ali Gisymar
AU  - Meysella Al Firdha Hanim
AU  - Danang Wahyu Muhammad
AU  - Ahdiana Yuni Lestari
AU  - Erna Tri Rusmala Ratnawati
Y1  - 2025/12/20
PY  - 2025
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20
T2  - International Journal of Law and Society
JF  - International Journal of Law and Society
JO  - International Journal of Law and Society
SP  - 369
EP  - 378
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-1908
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijls.20250804.20
AB  - This study analyzes the legal and institutional aspects of the establishment of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' during the early period of Prabowo Subianto's administration. The approach used is juridical-normative with doctrinal content analysis of primary regulations regarding the establishment and governance of Danantara supported by a systematic literature review combined with a comparative mapping of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) practices and the GAPP (Santiago Principles). Evaluation indicators include: legal basis and certainty of status, institutional design and lines of accountability, governance (composition and functions of boards/committees, checks and balances), transparency and auditing, clarity of investment mandates and role separation, risk management including ESG, and control of conflicts of interest. The results indicate three clusters of weaknesses: (i) legal absence of lex specialis and clear fiscal ring-fencing; (ii) institutional overlapping authorities of the government, Investment Management Agency, and Danantara, as well as weak independent oversight; and (iii) practice limitations in proactive reporting, the non-operational status of ESG policies, and inadequate conflict of interest regulations. The conclusion emphasizes the prematurity of Danantara as a reliable state investment entity. Recommendations include a legislative roadmap towards lex specialis, clarification of mandate demarcation, mandatory periodic public reporting, independent external audits, mainstreaming ESG based on indicators, and strengthening the conflict of interest prevention regime.
VL  - 8
IS  - 4
ER  -

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